Aug
5
In Search of Enduring Value
Filed Under B2B, Big Data, Blog, data protection, Financial services, healthcare, Industry Analysis, internet, online advertising, privacy, Reed Elsevier, Thomson, Uncategorized, Workflow | Leave a Comment
Yes, I remember Dun and Bradstreet. In the old UK headquarters in High Wycombe, the “white elephant” building that was intended to become the global data centre (in the days when you concentrated data instead of distributing it) had a waxwork figure in the foyer depicting a frock-coated Mr Dun (or was it Mr Bradstreet , or Lewis Tappan , the real founder?) collecting together the vital credit rating clues of the 1840s, as well as a discreet reminder that Abraham Lincoln had acted as as a data collector in Illinois in the 1850s. But the company I knew was a large and prosperous portfolio player, the very demonstrator for the theory that markets never go all bad at once, and that change in one can be nurtured from sustained growth in others. Under the portfolio, if I recall correctly, there nestled Nielsen in market research , IMS Health in medical market research, Donnelley in directories and market-leading marketing services, Cognizant in technology, Moodys in global rating services and Hoovers in company profiling. Never, you might say, was there a better example of a company with a portfolio of related interests who could interconnect these data collections to create fresh value in wider marketplaces – and take it all global as D&B itself was already going global. What a huge opportunity that now seems to create value through connecting hitherto unconnected data values and effect the type of transformation that Thomson Reuters are now attempting.
But the voices that D&B listened to were not the voices that said things like this. They were the siren voices of the market, who said that short term values could be increased by selling off all these allied companies, organizing the buyback of shares on a major scale and creating a greater value in the parent than would have been possible if it had remained in the group. So all of these companies went, and mostly to private equity buyers. But this was still not enough in terms of value creation, so the majority of the overseas subsidiaries were franchised to local operators , with valuable operations like China, Russia, Australia, and Germany having their data leased out to previously competing market players, who would then pay fees and royalties and contribute to the global data holding (now around 200 million companies and 53 m details of directors) in return for local re-use.
Markets and managements change, and over time D&B have bought back Hoovers ( revamped and without its research services ), and bought out their local franchise holders in places like China (where they now face a local data privacy infringement case) and Australia. No one adds the loss of value from these buybacks to the long term calculation, but presumably at some point the company became aware that by paring itself to the operational bone in search of value, it was actually losing opportunity. Now we gather (Wall Street Journal, 31 July 2012) that the company has been seeking a buyer for the past year, and has now appointed financial advisors to “explore opportunities” that may or may not lead to a sale.
D&B know all about creating value. In 1963 they created the DUNS number , forcing consistency and their own metadata on a market they meant to dominate globally. In just the same way IMS Health created its proprietory BRICS system for measuring medical activity in a community. Here were the forefathers of dominant metadata systems, whose value creation (think of the recent Thomson Reuters argument with the European Union over its RICS metadata nomenclature) is the bedrock of value add in data driven systems. Given its birthright, D&B might have been the dominant player today in value-added workflow services and systems offering solutions in areas like procurement and customer profiling. Question: has it been competitively outflanked by Experian (compare performances in Brazil, for example, where D&B have been since 1933) and lost touch with a value growth plan beyond buying back the franchises it once leased out?
It seems to me sometimes as if value in the sense that markets use the word is in fact a bell curve. It is clear how the asset sales drove D&B’s valuation up one side of this and how it has peaked through an inability to add fresh value in the narrow front on which it now operates, without the advantages of platform integration and Big Data-style development. It is possible that in places where these factors have come together (insurance risk in the US would be an example, where Lexis Risk use these elements to dominate in a related but consumer-orientated marketplace) it may be very difficult, without very extensive strategic partnerships and joint venturing, for D&B to prevent itself from losing ground.
So does this mean sale at a discount to a private equity player, or are there trade buyers who would offer a premium. Before Sanford Bernstein suggest again that Reed Elsevier should sell Lexis Law and buy this, let me just say that, in my view, the only real potential fit is with Thomson Reuters, and they probably have enough on their plates without trying to absorb a $1.7 bn revenue player, or Bloomberg. Competitors would all face anti-trust issues, but enterprize software and systems players might be interested – and D&B already has good links with Oracle.
A friend reading the last two pieces on this blog – a sort of odd trilogy on valuations – kindly asked how the UBM announcement that it “might” sell its “data services” fitted into all of this. Surely, as with D&B, we do not sell data at the moment: instead we try the alchemy of value add. So I have looked at this too, and am now even more confused than when I started. For example, by “data services” UBM appear to mean the databases from which they once sourced their print directory products. Apparently they have found that advertising online earns such diminished CPMs that it is very difficult to sustain the services. Similarly with Tech Insights, which they acquired and seems to suffer from the same problem. Is this surprizing? Not at all, since unless that data can be recombined with other internal or third party content there is no real hope of getting a subscription value from it. Advertising online is always going to be dodgy territory and at best a subsidiary income source.
And what does all this demonstrate ? Is the portfolio model broken for good and cannot ever be mended ? Or maybe D&B were right fifteen years ago , as Thomson Reuters are now : you can build portfolio if the players you buy are data-related and if you have platform and distributed search going for you . When D&B lost faith in their original model they did not have the technologies to do the job . So they followed the equity market view of value , and the chronic short term thinking that results from that has brought them to this . Now comes a more interesting question : what is credit rating and how do you reconstruct the service future of this marketplace ?
Jul
30
Good Bank, Bad Bank, Big Bank, Sad Bank
Filed Under B2B, Big Data, Blog, eBook, Education, eLearning, Financial services, healthcare, Industry Analysis, internet, news media, online advertising, Pearson, Publishing, Search, semantic web, STM, Uncategorized, Workflow | Leave a Comment
From Olympic Exile on the splendid South Shore of Nova Scotia, I can observe that the banking crisis continues apace, and that the original Swedish solution – put all the smelly bits into a special container called a Bad Bank and cut it free from the Mother Ship – still holds great appeal. I can also see that the financial market analyst demand to cut media companies up into “high growth, strong margins” companies and “low growth, declining margin” companies also has great appeal. We have seen it with McGraw-Hill and now with News International. The equity market analyst’s view (and media markets are almost always at their most dangerous when those who lead companies feel forced to follow the views of those ultimate exemplars of power without responsibility – or experience) seems to be at the moment that the assets which have responded least well to the digital revolution, or have been slowest to react, should be cordoned off and cut free. Very strange: I thought the whole idea of “portfolio” in media ownership was that assets developed at different speeds, and the fast growth ones thus gave “cover” – time and capital – to allow low growth assets to become fast growth again – perhaps with the help of judicious bolt – on acquisition on the way.
And then there is the question of cycles. Some of us apparently work in mini-cycles – the turn of markets within an 18 month period according to an analyst friend – while others are “macro-cycle minded”, which is where I am apparently involved. So if I thought that the reason for McGrawHill to hold onto its Education division was that education, alongside Healthcare, is the most enduring long term growth market we have, and that the portfolio duty of Standard and Poor’s was to enable McGraw’s education unit to get back on its feet, challenge Pearson’s leadership and buy the right catalytic add-on, then I was clearly wrong. Yet it seems to me clear that the future of rating agencies is quite as murky, from both a regulatory as well as a digital standpoint, as any other market. And is McGraw’s B2B, despite some distinguished work, really in the forefront of digital services and solutions in its verticals? Yet these are Good Bank assets, and Education is Bad Bank.
I could write the same about News Corp, television and newspapers. I am certain that no broadcast media have really absorbed the meaning of a networked society, and this is as true of the world of TV stations and cable companies as it is true of newspapers. Of course, one way around the problem is to sell while the going is good, as DMGT so signally failed to do in 2008 when they refused an offer of £1 billion for Northcliffe (regional press), an asset worth around £250m today. Sentiment forbade such a move as it once did at News Corp, so are players like DMGT destined to split to please investors? Apart from my respect for the bravery and ability to change involved in creating new B2B orientated DMGT out of old newspaper DMGT. who is to say that here no digital local manifestation can be created which will not replace traditional local newspapers? And how valuable, since they have them, would those local brands and franchises become in the new local? Especially at helping bits of B2B2C in markets like property reach ultimate consumers.
And where does the splitting end? The arguments that apply here apply equally to the Guardian Media Group, and are complicated by the fact that one investment made to give cover for the newspapers, EMAP, has faded faster than the newspapers themselves. Hopefully selling its half share of this and Autotrader will adjust the losses, and digital revenues (now up to £14.7 m and growing by 26% this year) will do the rest. But here we hit another problem: digital businesses may be more profitable, but they are also smaller. Digital newspaper ad revenue (Mail Online now stands at a forecast of £327m, with a target of £45 m in 2013) models are small, as are paywall models (Times Online now reaches £27m pa after a price hike) And the story of digital books is “less revenue, more margin, cannibalising customers to create a slightly smaller, slightly more profitable company”. What happens when we finish that short cycle?
Maybe the answer to the scale problem is that scale is becoming less important anyway. In a digital world if you have 50% of the workflow and solutions business in agriculture, why should you be in the same group as a content provider to the oil industry? Certainly our current ideas of scale came directly from the print world – you needed to be big enough to finance print runs that took, a day, a week or a year to sell. The cash flow model demanded scale. This is not so today, though I can well imagine a world where deploying common (and very expensive) technologies and having sufficient internal know-how to do so becomes a scale argument. Few B2B players “re-platforming” these days can be doing so, at quite a modest scale, at less than $1.5 m, even if their content is already in good XML order. Larger players face bigger bills, and these will be ongoing as we all go semantic web and Big Data. Then again you may need to be big to finance this as well as investing in collaboration with third parties – content-sharing, delivery mechanism-sharing, solution-sharing. And you may need to be big and diversified to fight off the next round of investors in this sector – the enterprize software vendors who will want to add your B2B solutions to their architecture (or maybe you will need to be big enough to attract them: it can be hard to tell).
So settle back for summer and await the next wave of splits rumours. Back to splitting up Informa? EMAP is already, like Gaul, divided into three parts and ready for resale. Pearson should certainly, in the analysts view, sell Penguin and the FT (despite the fact that they are appreciating nicely now, and they will only be needed as a votive offering to the markets when their sale can finance the next big education push/acquisition). Surely Wolters Kluwer should be subject to this one too – financial analysts sought the sale of its education and its academic publishing assets, and, having succeeded, still hunger for the news that Health is being sold away from law and tax.
Or maybe we should say that it is customer markets that change the size and scale of assets, not investment analysts who have a key interest in the outcomes that they recommend. Maybe we would get richer listening to our customers than listening to these back seat drivers?
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